I.

Introduction
Some sixty-seven years after the Holocaust, Guillaume Pepy, the chairman of Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français (SNCF), the French national railway company, apologized for transporting 76,000 people to Nazi death camps during the Second World War.
2 Pepy acknowledged that his firm's failure to respect human rights in the past was creating business risks in the present, and he feared that US state legislators would block the company from competing for high-speed rail contracts. The Mubarak regime then used the service to send pro-government text messages, calling for rallies and actions against democratic protestors.
5
Vodafone executives claimed that they were forced to comply with the emergency rules invoked by the Egyptian government and that the company could not contest the authorities. However, many human rights activists asserted that in doing so, Vodafone was indirectly complicit in violating human rights. 7 As these examples illustrate, when firms directly or indirectly violate human rights, they can create business risks. Such risks occur when an existing practice, relationship, or situation places the company at risk of involvement in human rights abuse. The costs to the firm may include legal liability, reputational and operational risks (such as work stoppages, boycotts, blackmail, and sabotage), and loss of investor or consumer confidence. 8 Firms should thus seek to prevent actual or perceived human rights risks. In doing so, the firm can meet its human rights responsibilities while reducing potential threats to the company. Some executives, however, may not be aware that their operations can affect human rights. Moreover, not all executives understand how to measure and assess their actual and perceived human rights risks. 9 Executives will need guidance, tools, practice, and time to learn how to ensure that they do not undermine the human rights of their stakeholders.
This chapter describes how the United Nations, and in particular Professor John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, developed the guidance and tools to help firms respect human rights. Under the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the GPs), executives are expected to attempt to monitor and measure their human rights "due diligence" and provide injured parties with access to remedies. These executives can no longer be willfully deaf, dumb or blind to the human rights consequences of their company's actions.
We make several points about this innovative attempt to flesh out the human rights responsibilities of business. Most analysts focus on how the GPs are soft law related to business, but we focus also on what they demand of nation states. The GPs advanced global governance by telling policymakers that governments must do more to ensure that firms do not undermine human rights at home and abroad. The GPs are a governance hybrid: they link governments' international human rights obligations to voluntary initiatives by businesses. Yet they are not well known or well understood by the people they are designed to serve. Although they were developed in a transparent, global and inclusive manner, very few individuals, firms, and NGOs actually participated in the development of the GPs. The public and most executives were unaware and uninvolved in this process. 10 Since the GPs were first issued in 2011 (and the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework in 2008), relatively few firms are implementing the GPs in full or in part. Despite the potential costs to the firm of human rights risks, many executives seem to believe it is too costly and time consuming to implement the GPs. Hence, we argue that this hybrid governance tool needs more policymaker support and creative thinking to succeed.
We have been studying the adoption of the GPs since 2011. Although the number of firms implementing the GPs is gradually increasing, the number of corporate adopters remains small.
Herein, we blame governments, as well as business. We believe governments are not doing enough to inform their firms about their human rights responsibilities or about the GPs. After all, under international law governments have the principal responsibility to protect human rights against abuse by third parties, including business enterprises. According to the GPs, states "should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations."
11
The GPs also recommended that states could use tools, including regulatory or procurement policies, to encourage business respect for human rights.
12
This chapter is organized as follows: we begin with background on Ruggie's work. Next we assess how business and governments responded to the GPs. Finally, we develop our argument that states must do more to encourage understanding and uptake of the GPs.
II. Background
In 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan decided it was time to develop clearer standards for business and human rights responsibilities. Annan appointed Harvard Professor John Ruggie to be the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 13 Ruggie was determined to develop workable human rights norms. He knew that many policymakers and executives viewed an earlier attempt to develop workable standards ("the Norms") as a "train wreck."
14
He also recognized that although some corporations accept some human rights responsibilities (as shown by their human rights policies or codes of conduct); most executives have long opposed imposing mandatory human rights obligations. 15 Ruggie and his team began the process that ultimately led to the GPs by mapping out the state of play in the realm of business and human rights. The team found that it would not be easy to develop actionable recommendations for several reasons. First, every firm is different, and the human rights that a textile firm may impact, for example labor rights and access to water, may be different from those that an Internet company may impact, for example freedom of speech or privacy rights. The team examined 320 instances of alleged corporate human rights abuse between February 2005 and December 2007. They found that firms not only violated labor rights, but also many other internationally recognized human rights, such as the right to a fair trial, the right to marry and form a family, and the right of peaceful assembly. Moreover, they found that workers constituted only 45% of the persons affected by these abuses; communities were affected in 45% of cases, and end-users in 10%. 16 Second, managers may not be aware that their firms can impact human rights because they may never have had a scandal or seen human rights as creating liability. Third, because the advancement of human rights has long been seen as the exclusive domain of states, "business policies and practices in the area of human rights remain largely voluntary."
17
Fourth, it would not be easy to hold firms and their affiliates accountable because many multinational corporations operate globally through subsidiaries and indirect suppliers. Many of these firms are incorporated locally and are corporate citizens of the host country. Therefore, these same firms could have thousands of suppliers, which would make it difficult to hold firms and their affiliates accountable.
18
Indeed, Ruggie's study of corporate human rights abuses found that 41% of alleged abuses occurred through indirect operations, such as through the supply chain. as well as what governments were asking their domestic firms to do. Ruggie and his team recognized the complexity of this task, first analyzing options for a business and human rights treaty. He ultimately concluded that there was no appetite for a new human rights treaty amongst UN member states, that such a treaty could take many years to negotiate, and that a treaty may be ineffective, especially due to a lack of impact after ratification, the difficulties of establishing an enforcement mechanism, and conflicting obligations under other international treaties. Ninety percent of those respondents reported that they had an explicit set of human rights practices or management practices, but fewer than half said they had experienced a significant human rights issue. Almost all of the responding companies said they included human rights in their code; only 40 percent of those polled had a freestanding human rights protocol.
25
Most companies focused their codes on the rights of workers, referring to the International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions.
26
Almost none of the companies referred to the International Bill of Human Rights, although some referred to the UDHR, the second most frequently cited source of human rights standards after the ILO conventions.
27
The respondents showed significant regional variations in human rights practices. For example, Ruggie found, "European multinationals were more likely than their American counterparts to reference the rights to health and to an adequate standard of living. They were also more likely to state that their human rights policies extended beyond the workplace to include their impact on the communities where they operate. U.S. and Japanese firms tended to recognize a narrower spectrum of rights and rights holders. The most widely cited right by Chinese companies at the time… was the right to development, which few Western governments or companies recognize."
28
Thus, how or whether firms protected human rights had a lot to do with the culture and priorities of firms' home countries.
Finally the survey addressed how these firms were to be held accountable for human rights. Some 75 percent of respondents said they engaged in external reporting. One-third said they routinely conducted human rights impact assessments; and just under half reported that they did so occasionally.
29
These findings from the first survey seemed to indicate that businesses who responded were relatively active in advancing human rights. Ruggie and his team concluded that this survey was skewed, as it had a relatively low response rate and few of the respondents came from Asia or Latin America.
30
The team next examined the human rights policies of a more general sample of 300 firms through a second survey in 2006.
31
As before, they found most companies include labor rights in their code, but fewer firms recognize non-labor rights, such as the right to privacy.
32
The third survey, administered in 2007, focused on twenty-five Chinese companies. The results showed that Chinese firms recognized fewer rights than European or North American companies, but were "slightly more likely to recognize social and economic rights," reflecting Chinese government activism related to some rights, such as access to education.
33
With this mapping, Ruggie and his team were able to create a framework that defined the responsibilities of states and business.
34
He considered voluntary initiatives, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, to be "a significant force to build on," although they "fell short as a stand-alone approach," as firms were reluctant to integrate CSR activities into core business functions and to provide affected individuals with any means of recourse. However, companies would be "tried in the court of public opinion" for their failure to respect human rights. 37 Ruggie added that where national legal systems already provide for the criminal punishment of companies, international standards meant to apply to individuals could also apply to business enterprises that are persons in the legal sense. 38 Ruggie's team conducted eight studies of how governments interpret the state duty to protect against human rights violations. There are over thirty human rights set forth in the UDHR.
39
To ensure that governments promote these rights, policymakers developed two covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
40
Together, the UDHR and the two covenants comprise the International Bill of Human Rights. 41 However, not all states have signed onto both covenants, and that political reality may be reflected in the human rights practices of their national firms.
42
The ICCPR generally delineates rights that a state may not take away from its citizens, such as freedom of speech or freedom of movement.
43
In contrast, the ICESCR generally lists the rights that a state, insofar as it is able, should provide for its citizens, such as basic education or health care. 44 Thus, under the ICESCR, a state has an active duty to promote some rights, while under the ICCPR, a state is restricted from acting in a manner that jeopardizes or adversely affects other rights.
The team found that "not all states appear to have internalized the full meaning of the state duty to protect and its implications with regard to preventing and punishing abuses by business enterprises."
45
The team also discovered that policymakers were confused as to when and how they should protect citizens from corporate human rights abuse as part of the state duty to protect.
46
Finally, while no treaty bans extraterritorial actions, Ruggie argued that states do not take full advantage of available legal and policy tools to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over companies. 47 Ruggie concluded that states should take steps to "prevent, investigate, punish and redress" human rights abuses.
48
In doing so, policymakers will "foster a corporate culture respectful of human rights."
49
To achieve this goal, he asserted, policymakers can provide assistance and guidance to the businesses domiciled within their borders, enforce existing laws, and create greater policy coherence among government departments, such as trade and investment that can have unanticipated human rights spillover effects. This framework outlined the state duty to protect citizens from human rights abuses, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the need for corporations as well as states to provide access to effective remedies when rights are violated.
52
The forty-seven members of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) unanimously endorsed Protect, Respect and Remedy in 2008 and extended Ruggie's mandate so that he could report on "operationalizing" the framework. 53 This framework declared that firms should have a means of due diligence, which is "the steps a company must take to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts."
54
The framework included four components of due diligence. First, firms should adopt a human rights policy. Second, to determine their potential human rights footprint, firms should conduct impact assessments by taking "proactive steps to understand how existing and proposed activities may affect human rights." 55 Third, firms should integrate their human rights policies throughout the company. Thus, all corporate employees should be aware of both their human rights responsibilities and how to ensure that in doing their jobs the firm does not undermine human rights. Fourth, firms should track performance, which the framework defines as "monitoring and auditing processes" to which "regular updates of human rights impact and performance are crucial."
56
The framework also stated that a firm's due diligence process should apply to its business partners and suppliers.
57
In so doing, Ruggie's team had made it clear that firms would be expected to hold their affiliates responsible for human rights. The draft was open for public consultation via an online forum until 31 January 2011. 59 Ruggie released a final version which incorporated these comments, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, on 21 March 2011.
60
The forty-seven members of the UNHRC formally approved the GPs by consensus on 16 June 2011. 61 Ruggie stressed that in order to hold firms accountable for their behavior, policymakers, consumers, and other corporate stakeholders should be able to monitor corporate performance.
62
Hence the framework encouraged firms to report on their human rights impacts and make such reports public: "Business enterprises whose operations or operating contexts pose risks of severe human rights impacts should report formally on how they address them." 63 Finally, the framework stated that both states and corporations should provide victims and potential victims of human rights abuses with access to remedies through grievance mechanisms.
64
Grievance mechanisms could either be state-based judicial or non-judicial mechanisms or non-judicial mechanisms administered by a business enterprise alone or with stakeholders, an industry association, or multi-stakeholder group.
65
The framework also stated that these grievance mechanisms must be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, and a source of continuous learning, while company-provided mechanisms must also be based on engagement and dialogue. However, many of the companies supposedly implementing the GPs were in fact simply noting that they existed; and there was little evidence that these firms were actually altering their policies or business practices. Barclays Bank provides a good example. Although Barclays was supposedly implementing the GPs, as of December 2013, it had not outlined a commitment to conducting systematic human rights impact assessments, and it is still part of an informal group "reviewing the implications" of the GPs for the financial sector.
69
GE was also highlighted in this report for changing its policy to reflect Ruggie's guidelines. Yet, as of December 2013 the company's policy still did not recognize the complete International Bill of Human Rights, the company did not have robust reporting on its human rights and did not publish information on how it had integrated human rights into its operations and whether it had established grievance mechanisms. The company does state that it conducts impact assessments "as appropriate," but only related to major infrastructure project financing.
70
Both Barclays and GE are doing more to monitor their human rights footprint, but we can hardly argue that either firm is implementing the GPs.
For the GPs to be successful, policymakers need to make them well-known and wellunderstood. Ruggie's team tried: they held forty-one multi-stakeholder meetings on every continent during the six-year mandate.
71
Every document, comment, and meeting report was posted on the website of the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC).
72
The team also asked for public comments on the GPs, and commentaries could be submitted either by posting on BHRRC or via the online forum from 22 November 2010 to 31 January 2011.
73
However, they received only ninety submissions by the deadline.
74
Moreover, the bulk of the submissions came from academics and activists, rather than executives and policymakers. 75 We don't know why executives were so uninvolved, but the failure to encourage firms, NGOs, and in particular governments, to participate in the development of the GPs resonates today.
II.
What States Have Done
Throughout most of the period in which the framework and GPs were developed, policymakers were relatively silent about Ruggie's objectives, strategy, and guidelines. In 2006, his team sent a survey to each of the 192 UN member states, but only twenty-nine responded.
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Moreover, many of those twenty-nine governments did not respond to all of his questions. 
80
For example, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom allow individuals to sue companies for human rights violations. 81 Ruggie's team also asked policymakers why they found it so difficult to encourage multinationals to advance human rights. Policymakers cited the nonexistence of an international framework, the absence of an internationally recognized body to monitor violations, the lack of information between states, and "the uneven playing field in this area, resulting in very different national laws and regulations." The team also asked what governments should do to ensure that firms did not undermine human rights. Eleven states responded they should promote CSR, fourteen said states should enforce human rights norms for business, and two states argued that governments should mediate disputes between firms and alleged victims of human rights abuse.
82
Governments were clearly divided as to how to encourage business-human rights responsibility. Ruggie's team also looked at how governments use corporate and securities law to affect business human rights practices. In a 2009 survey, the team found virtually no jurisdiction that explicitly regulates corporations on the issue of human rights through corporate and securities law.
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As noted above, the GPs make clear that governments have the principal responsibility to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business enterprises. States were thus advised to meet their duty to protect by enforcing existing human rights laws, ensuring policy coherence, providing guidance to firms on how to respect human rights, and encouraging firms to report on their human rights performance. The GPs also advised on how states could use tools such as procurement policies, new legislation and regulation, and denying access to public support to advance business respect for human rights.
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In 2011, some states worked multilaterally to reinforce the GPs.
85
In May, forty-two countries (the thirty-four members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as well as many other middle income countries) endorsed the revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which for the first time included human rights language from the GPs.
86
These guidelines are voluntary recommendations that governments make to their firms; they state that firms should adopt human rights due diligence processes.
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The OECD Guidelines also include a new, tougher process for complaints and mediation on human rights issues. The United States has also become active in implementing both the GPs and specific U.S.-led initiatives to advance business and human rights. The Department of State has argued that it is in the U.S. national interest to ensure that business respects human rights at home and abroad, and thus bolsters, rather than undermines U.S. soft power.
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Hence the Obama Administration has taken several steps. In July 2012, the U.S. State Department developed reporting requirements for national firms investing in Burma. This new rule forces US firms with operations or suppliers in Burma to report on, amongst other anti-corruption and environmental issues, their due diligence policies and procedures that address operational impacts on human rights and worker rights.
98
The State Department clarified in September 2013 that these requirements are directly informed by the best practices outlined in the GPs.
99
The U.S. has also used public-private partnerships to encourage business respect for human rights. For example, the U.S. government has been active in shaping the Public Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade, an initiative "designed to support conflict-free supply chains in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and promote conflict-free sourcing from within the region." 
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The U.S. government has also been active in public-private partnerships pertaining to the human rights of privacy and freedom of expression. The US helped to create the Freedom Online Coalition, a group of 19 governments engaging with private sector companies and coordinating diplomatic efforts to promote Internet freedom. The government was also involved in creating the Global Network Initiative, which assists technology companies in developing policies and best practices for respecting these human rights.
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In sum, several industrialized nations are taking steps to encourage the firms they call home to adopt the GPs. The UK is also trying to encourage other governments to adopt the GPs.
But these governments are few. Moreover, no government has found a way to ensure that all of its firms implement the GPs in all operating contexts. Sector-specific guidelines and regulations for firms investing in high risk jurisdictions could be useful, but such initiatives may not cover the full range of internationally recognized human rights.
III.
What Companies Have Done
The global business community's response to the GPs was relatively unenthusiastic.
Major international business associations such as the International Chamber of Commerce, Many of the more supportive firms had been seeking clarity on the human rights responsibilities of business. These firms wanted to avoid business risk in the future and to ensure fair practices by their competitors. According to Novo Nordisk, "[C]ommon standards for business would help to provide a level playing field and prevent human rights violations."
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Likewise, BP called the framework "a unique chance to lay to rest a long-standing international debate about whether mandatory norms are required."
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BP asserted that common standards will "help to clarify some of the more challenging human rights issues businesses face."
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The firm also claimed that in 2012 it developed an action plan to implement the GPs, although it was not clear as of December 2013 whether this plan had been integrated into the firm's operations.
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These comments reveal that some firms were prepared to adopt the GPs, but most firms will need greater understanding about the GPs and how to implement them. Moreover, unless the majority of firms take action, early adaptors could face an uneven playing field, where some firms establish due diligence mechanisms at considerable cost and others do nothing. That imbalance well describes the current reality.
Although a growing number of executives acknowledge human rights responsibilities, most executives at the bulk of the world's firms do not. In Ruggie's studies at the onset of his mandate, he received responses from only 102 of the Fortune Global 500 firms regarding their human rights policies. In May 2011, the BHRRC listed 275 companies that had explicit policies on human rights; these 275 companies formed the basis for our initial study on corporate uptake the framework and GPs.
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As of December 2013, that number had increased to 323.
114
We took a closer look at the 323 companies with human rights policies to obtain a fuller understanding of what firms are doing and where.
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The BHRRC list does not include all companies with strong human rights records, because such companies may not have formal policies or made such policies public.
116
Hence this list, like Ruggie's surveys, is incomplete.
Nonetheless, we chose to use this list as the basis of our study as it is the most complete list available, and some firms note their inclusion in the list in their CSR reporting. Moreover, having a policy is the primary component of a due diligence process according to the GPs and is the basis for integrating respect for human rights into corporate operations.
In the nearly three years that have passed since the GPs were approved by the UNHRC, only 48 companies have been added to this list of firms that have human rights policies.
Although this represents an increase of 17.45%, the 323 firms listed account for just 0.40% of all 80,000 multinational corporations. Additionally, while each of these 323 firms has a policy, most of them do not meet the minimum criteria of Ruggie's framework for the GPs, which is a publicly available human rights policy that is approved at the most senior level of the business enterprise, is informed by internal and external expertise, stipulates the enterprise's human rights expectations of personal and business partners, is communicated internally and externally to all personnel and business partners, and is reflected in operational policies and procedures necessary to embed it throughout the enterprise.
117
It is difficult to quantify the policies that meet these criteria, as firms do no consistently report on the extent to which they communicate human rights policies to staff and the level at which the policy has been approved. Moreover, many companies with human rights policies do not address the full range of human rights covered in the GPs.
Ruggie suggested that "companies should look, at a minimum, to the International Bill of Human Rights and the core conventions of the ILO" when determining their human rights responsibilities.
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While in our original study we found that only eight companies acknowledged the complete International Bill and the five ILO core conventions, we also found that it was common for companies to selectively implement aspects of these standards, such as the In addition, the Working Group identified regional organizations as 'key multipliers in dissemination efforts' and were planning to engage with the African Union and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.
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Despite this progress, the Working Group has admitted, 'awareness in most industry sectors remains low', and 'there is an overwhelming lack of awareness of the Guiding Principles among stakeholders globally, particularly business, and especially small and medium-sized enterprises.'
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We believe that this persistent ignorance from business stems from a lack of education from governments.
IV. Conclusion
The Guiding Principles represent a governance innovation: they are a transparent, multisectoral effort to clarify the human rights responsibilities of business. The GPs encourage firms to move beyond apologies towards positive actionable steps. In doing so, the GPs are righting business. However, governments and corporations have thus far taken little initiative to implement the GPs.
Readers may wonder why so few firms are implementing the GPs or adopting human rights policies. First, human rights are relatively new on the business agenda. Second, governments have long struggled to respect human rights-firms are in an early phase of the learning curve. Early adapters may be better positioned to amortize the costs of adhering to human rights and could use their support of human rights as a marketing and public relations tool. Unfortunately, early adopters are rare. Those companies that have not acted may not perceive that their firm is at risk for directly or indirectly violating human rights or they may not be aware of this initiative. Third, implementing the GPs will be expensive and time consuming.
Many executives are still unconvinced they need to do more than they are already doing.
However, herein we put most of the blame on governments. We argue that most states have not made implementing the GPs a policy priority. It is evident that firms' respect for human rights is more prevalent when business and human rights is higher on a national policy agenda.
The few states that have created actionable plans for implementing components of the GPs also see higher numbers of domestic firms adopting human rights policies. Until governments provide the incentive for executives to act, uptake of the GPs will continue to be minimal.
If policymakers want to be supportive of the GPs, they should take several steps to encourage business implementation. First, policymakers must educate their national firms regarding their human rights responsibilities. They should clearly delineate their expectations for firms and provide assistance in implementing human rights impact assessments, grievance mechanisms, and other aspects of due diligence. Policymakers should also make it clear that firms are responsible for the behavior of their suppliers.
Governments, such as the U.S., South Africa and Malaysia, that have not ratified all components of the International Bill of Human Rights, will need to decide if they will selectively encourage implementation the GPs.
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U.S. officials, as an example, may find it difficult to encourage U.S. companies to respect and remedy human rights, (such as the right to health, access to affordable medicines and access to water) which are not reflected in national law.
Second, policymakers should do their own due diligence and examine the signals domestic laws and regulations send to market actors about protecting human rights. If trade, investment, tax, and corporate governance rules send confusing messages, policymakers should find ways to foster greater understanding. Additionally, they should develop a regular channel for human rights concerns to enter into the policymaking process. The U.S. and the EU already examine the labor and environmental impacts of their trade agreements; they and other countries could broaden that analysis to include other human rights.
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Such reforms may slow policy, but over time state policy will become more coherent.
In sum, Ruggie and his team effectively altered the debate over business and human rights. They made it clear why firms and states needed to act.
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However, if only a few firms from some countries implement the GPs, these guidelines will have minimal impact.
In our earlier study, we noted two key gaps in the GPs: they do not discuss the important role of business in paying taxes and in so doing, being good corporate citizens; and Ruggie never received a mandate to build a public case for business to respect human rights.
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In an influential article published in 1982, Ruggie argued that many industrialized countries found a compromise to make globalization acceptable, which became known as embedded liberalism.
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These countries put in place a social compact: workers would receive a cushion from the vagaries of globalization; this cushion (unemployment, retraining, and in many countries healthcare) would be paid for by higher taxes. In recent years, however, embedded liberalism has been under threat by corporations and policymakers. First, corporations have signaled less willingness to accept this grand bargain. Executives recognize that they can move to lower tax venues or shelter income.
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They have directly and indirectly pressured government officials to keep taxes and budgets low. Many industrialized states have gradually lowered their taxes on multinational corporations. Policymakers recognize that they can't maintain jobs if they don't entice business to invest.
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Secondly, these same officials are under pressure to reduce government spending to bring deficits under control. But these cuts often hurt the poor and needy, who benefit from subsidies, such as as healthcare and education.
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The GPs say nothing about the political responsibilities of business to pay taxes to ensure that citizens have access to affordable healthcare, education, water, etc., which are basic human rights according to the International Bill of Human Rights.
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We therefore argued that the corporate responsibility to pay taxes, which essentially are investments in public goods, is a key, albeit missing, element of the GPs. As of December 2013, we still have not found evidence of governments addressing these issues from a human rights perspective, nor has the Working Group provided any clear guidance on this front.
Additionally, Ruggie did not receive a mandate to build a public case for business to protect human rights. Thus, although the debate over the GPs was open to the public, the public was uninformed and uninvolved. As governments, activists, and firms work to implement the GPs, they should begin by explaining to the public why these principles are necessary, useful, and in the public interest. The Working Group has tried to market the GPs to more people around the world, but the principles remain relatively unknown, unappreciated, and underachieving. 
